SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: ORGANIZATION FOR THE LONG WAR
Security Force Assistance has been a practice of the United States throughout its long and storied history. 1 Security assistance allows the United States to remain engaged with countries whose conflict or impending conflict impacts U.S. national
interest. This form of assistance allows the U.S. to provide a measured commitment of forces and equipment, and if required is postured to quickly respond with increased military and civilian support. 2 Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, defines security force assistance as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security force assistance (SFA) improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel-that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission. 3 General Dempsey, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command identified the two pillars of security force assistance, the modular brigade and the Soldiers acting as advisors. 4 The modular brigade forms the core of the organizational structure and is subsequently augmented with personnel and equipment according to the specific SFA mission requirements. Once the brigade receives the security assistance mission, it conducts a detailed mission analysis to identify the additional requirements. 5 Security force assistance is a critical component of Stability Operations. Our military can clear and hold terrain, but without the ability of the host nation to provide for its own long-term security, a stable and secure environment is out of its grasp. 6 In a counterinsurgency the center of gravity is the people. An effective government able to provide security and stability for its population will ultimately lead to defeating an insurgency. The security force assistance mission performs a major role in developing an effective security sector and government. 7 The Army's current role in providing security assistance to Foreign Security Forces (FSF) is achieving much success. The brigade combat teams, however, are experiencing challenges in manning, equipping and training to conduct this complex and difficult mission. As the Army emerges from a generation of training for conventional threats oriented on offensive and defensive operations, leaders and Soldiers must shift their way of thinking to effectively conduct full spectrum operations. This represents a significant change in how conventional Army units have trained in the past.
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In the security force assistance mission, BCTs must not only train on defeating an enemy through offensive, defensive and stability tasks, but must also know how to advise, assist and enable foreign security forces to take the lead. Security force assistance adds not only a new set of tasks to train to, but also requires a change in a way of thinking. SFA is a doable mission, but one that requires a universal paradigm shift to effectively execute the mission. The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance (MB-SFA) 10 The BCT is capable of providing command and control in autonomous operations from brigade to platoon level for extended periods. It can also provide internal security as well as conduct offensive and defensive tasks in major combat operations as • Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)
• Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)
• Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)
• Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)
• Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)
• Employ Fires (ART 3.0)
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Integral to successful stability operations is the security force assistance mission conducted by the brigade combat team. 14 Over the past several years, many papers, studies, books, lessons learned, AARs and doctrine were developed to assist the BCT in effectively manning, equipping and training the force for the security force mission.
BCTs conducting the security force assistance mission have increased their focus to prepare for offensive and defensive operations as well as stability and security operations. Given this additional requirement in a routinely compressed preparation timeline, the BCT has the complex task of developing a detailed plan to prepare for the SFA mission. Because the Institutional Army is still developing how to man, train and equip the BCT conducting the SFA mission, the BCT must do much of the heavy lifting on its own. When tasked to for SFA as part of stability operations, the BCT must conduct a thorough mission analysis to determine the unique manning, equipping and training task requirements to prepare the BCT for its specific SFA mission.
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MB-SFA Tasks/Capabilities Requirements versus Training/Manning Gaps.
The once believed notion that units with core combat skills focused on major combat operations could easily adapt to other types of operations such as stability operations in a counterinsurgency is not altogether valid.
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There is a Mission to Task training and manning gap that exists in the BCT in supporting its security force assistance mission. The way ahead is to identify the gaps between the security force assistance mission requirements and the unit's capabilities. The Security Force Assistance Essential Task List is the core focus for the MB-SFA mission.
• Organize
• Train
• Equip
• Rebuild and Build
• Advise and Assist 21 An assumption is that the MB-SFA is augmented to support capability requirements outlined in FM 3-07.1 based on three operational phases. Phase I-Initial
Response Phase, Phase II-Transformation Phase, and Phase III-Fostering Sustainability Phase.
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The primary purpose for establishing SFA phases is to assist the BCT in planning and organizing for the security assistance mission, acknowledging the effect of the changing environment on the mission requirements.
The following description of the three operational phases provides the basis for later assumptions on MB-SFA requirements and capabilities. 23 Field Manual 3-07.1 states that BCTs conducting SFA can begin operations at any phase and move any direction through phases as the operational environment requires. 24 All three phases focus on assistance in developing capability and capacity of the host nation's foreign security is non-permission and is heavily reliant on ePRTs for reconstruction and stability assistance and S-TTs to provide advise and assist support to host nation forces. 26 Phase II, Transformation Phase, begins a primary shift focus to hold and build.
The key trigger to initiate this phase is the shift from a non-permissive to a permissive environment. The preponderance of augmentation requirements remains heavily reliant on ePRT and the S-TT advisors. 27 Once permissive conditions exist civilian experts can begin to fill support role of the ePRT. In the Transformation Phase FSFs begin to rely less on SFA in support of tactical operations with more reliance on enabling assistance. 28 Phase III, Fostering Sustainability Phase, marks a major shift from building capacity and capability and focuses on a more broad based assistance in stabilizing and sustainment of the FSF. In Phase III MB-SFA unit begins to withdraw from the host nation with emphasis on augmentation shifting to civil affairs, legal teams, and ePRT to assist in broader stability and reconstruction efforts. 29 As a note, it is not uncommon for phases to overlap due to different stages of development throughout the MB-SFA operational area. Commanders must continue to assess development throughout the MB-SFA area to maintain a good understanding of the MB-SFA operating environment. 30 The previous sections established a fundamental starting point for the remainder of this examination. The next section identifies the specific tasks and capabilities required to conduct SFA in order to determine if the MB-SFA is effectively manned and trained to accomplish the SFA mission. Training for the purpose of this section is primarily focused on individual training levels. A more comprehensive review on training is examined in a subsequent section of this paper.
A common training requirement that is identified throughout the next section is the need to train in host nation culture, language, and an understanding of FSF systems, operations, and procedures.
Security Force Assistance
The primary tasks of Security Force Assistance as outlined in 3-07.1, Security
Force Assistance, focuses on the following categories: organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Build, and Advise and Assist. 31 Organize. The organize task consists of the MB-SFA assisting security forces with improving their ability to organize military and civilian security forces and to operate under established administrative systems and processes, while sustaining the force.
This review begins with Organize the Force. 32 The specified tasks required to advise, assist and partner the host nation's security forces with Organizing include recruiting, promotion screening and selection, pay and benefits, leader recruiting and selection, and demobilization of security force personnel. Train. The modular brigade combat team is well suited to train basic core skills in individual, Leader and collective tasks in a full spectrum environment and to develop training and education programs to assist foreign security forces build its security capability. 44 The specified tasks required to advise, assist and partner with the host nation's security forces include training the U.S. trainer, establishing training standards, training foreign security forces, training leaders, and employing newly trained forces. Advisors can provide assistance in filling this gap. Identified as a constraint is a requirement for advisors to be no less than one rank lower than their counterparts they advise. 53 Partnering MB-SFA companies with FSF battalion's is generally accepted;
however, there is an experience gap associated with a company commander and headquarters element supporting battalion level operations. 54 A second identified capability gap exists in the MB-SFA's ability to effectively partner with host nation law enforcement. Law enforcement can include district to provincial civilian police, border police, special team police, and FSF military police, the latter is a growing focus in FSF militaries. 55 The MB-SFA's internal military police platoon is capable of assisting FSF police forces, but lacks the capacity without augmentation to effectively support multiple police units. The MB-SFA is often required to use conventional ground forces as police trainers and should be parade to plan and execute police training as part of the MB-SFA pre-deployment preparation. 56 An option to the MB-SFA Commander is augmenting their training force with foreign security force trainers. The integration of host nation forces can relieve manning issues, and build partner relations between host nation and U.S. forces.
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A third capability gap exists in the MB-SFA's capacity to support judicial system requirements without the appropriate level of augmentation. Judicial system functions range from district to provincial level. The judicial system is an essential component of security assistance covering a wide range of tasks from rule of law to converting targeting intelligence into evidence that can be used to convict insurgents and criminals. 58 The MB-SFA is organically task organized with a brigade legal team, but lacks the capacity to provide assistance beyond internal brigade legal support activities.
The MB-SFA legal activities include administrative tasks as well as operational tasks. The requirement to procure like host nation equipment or comparable systems and requirements for distribution above division level may require Echelons Above
Brigade (EAB) support or interagency support. These processes should be identified during the MB-SFA mission analysis of Foreign Security Systems and requirements. 67 The MB-SFA should understand the host nation's procurement systems and be prepared to identify additional support requirements after arriving in theater. 68 To effectively support operations, the MB-SFA may consider co-locating sustainment sections to assist in training and developing processes and systems. The This is a culminating event that exercises the command, staff and advisor teams working through a foreign security force problem scenario. It is evident that stability operations supported by security force assistance will remain on the Army's scope for the near future. It is therefore necessary that the Army continues to work on shaping its training institutions to ensure we effectively prepare the force for the complexities of Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance in a Full Spectrum Environment.
While the Army struggles with how to fight and win in a full spectrum environment, COIN versus Major Combat Operations (MCO), it will need to determine a balanced approach in our institutional training system to effectively support both.
In the interim, commanders will continue to be faced with a myriad of tasks to ensure the organization is prepared to execute fairly broad set missions. Commander's must manage their time closely to train and maintain critical core capabilities that are easily lost if not practiced i.e. fire support skills, mechanized and armor gunnery and maneuver skills. The BCTs often use armor and fire support units in the motorized/dismounted role and therefore have to prioritize which types of tasks to be trained.
Army training institutions are now introducing stability operations from basic to advance enlisted and officer training. As the Army finds a balance in its warfighting curriculum, Soldiers and leaders will become more evenly grounded in a full spectrum of operations.
Leaders and staffs need to continue to be creative in the resourcing and execution of full spectrum training. Commanders should not expect to be organized or equipped how they will fight during their initial reset phase, and possibly into their initial phase of training. It is important not to fall into the trap of not training for lack of personnel and equipment. Commanders need to be judicious with all opportunities to prepare their organization for deployment. etc.
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The NTC has developed a plan for training Security Training Teams (S-TT) during Reception, Staging, Onward-movement & Integration (RSO&I) and have designed situational training exercise (STX) lanes to exercise the S-TTs advisory skills. 84 The SFA mission has stretched the NTC when setting the conditions for a MB-SFA. A MB-SFA can arrive to the NTC with more than a dozen S-TTs. This combined with the MB-SFA partnering tasks and the requirement for trained FSF role often exceeds the CTCs capacity to effectively fill all of its roles. This is an example of where manning increases can further support the training institution in support of Stability
Operations in a Full Spectrum Environment. 85 The intent of this paper was to examine the BCT as the organizational structure designated to conduct the mission of Security Force Assistance. This paper concludes that the modular Brigade Combat Team is currently the right organization for the security force assistance mission, but not without caveats. The key factors affecting the BCT in conducting the SFA mission are, 1) inadequate doctrinal guidance required to execute SFA, 2) insufficient unit dwell time to organize, equip and train effectively for its SFA mission, while balancing the need to maintain training levels in critical core tasks, and 3) identification of several manning and training capability gaps despite the approved augmentation package. This requires the MB-SFAs to plan training against the additional tasks of security force assistance in an existing constrained resource environment.
